The military ambitions of oil states

When Saudi Arabia sent its army into neighbouring Yemen in 2015 to support the besieged president, Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, in the civil war, the coalition included 500 soldiers from Mauritania. The impoverished West African state cannot afford such military adventures, and the country’s strategic interests in this Yemeni civil war are hard to discern.

The explanation has a slightly different angle. Mauritania had joined the list of countries in the Sahel region that received generous financial support from Saudi Arabia and its coalition partner, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) – and in 2020, the latter trumped all by investing 2 billion dollars in Mauritania. That’s considerable in a country with an annual GDP of $5 billion.

This particular form of development aid is not quite comparable to what we in the Western world understand by the term. The purpose is clearly to gain influence, particularly military dominance.

Oil revenues changed everything

This is just one of several developments in the three oil states of Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Qatar that Jean-Loup Samaan, a researcher in Middle East strategic relations at the University of Singapore, describes in his latest book. And it makes for rather worrying reading.

The three states have always been considered military lightweights. For example, when Saudi Arabia emerged as a state in its current form in 1932, it did have a defence, but this was more to maintain the delicate balance between the various tribal communities and emirates that were now to be governed from the capital Riyadh. For the same reason, military powers were delegated to local leaders, so a leading role in the country’s defence became contingent on personal prestige rather than actual qualifications.

As times changed and oil wealth began to pour in, this picture changed, too. Suddenly, the oil states became strategically important on a global scale, and the region became an important piece in the political and military game during the Cold War. As a result, large sums of money began to be spent on military hardware, but this, too, followed its own pattern. Expensive weapon systems were purchased, but only sometimes based on an analysis of what was actually needed. The dominant motive was to place orders in countries with which it was profitable to be on good terms, and for the same reason, it was the same (often Western) producer countries that provided the military advisors, which in many cases led to the foreign powers actually managing the defence of the oil states. In addition, weapons systems that had no practical significance but looked good at military parades, reflecting power and potency, were often purchased.

developments led to this picture being unsustainable in the long run, leading to the emergence of a new and potentially more dangerous military strategy in the Gulf region.

Chinese arms manufacturers

The scheme created a unique dynamic and, more importantly, fuelled a lucrative arms trade. To this day, the three oil states account for 17 percent of all arms purchases worldwide.

However, developments led to this picture being unsustainable in the long run, leading to the emergence of a new and potentially more dangerous military strategy in the Gulf region. With the end of the Cold War and especially after #9/11, global alliance relationships have changed radically and are far more volatile than before. At the same time, new players such as India and China have entered the scene. So today, the rulers of the oil states no longer want to be dependent on others. The professionalisation of defence forces must continue, but on their own terms, and they have become more discerning when it comes to new weapons purchases. Typically, a number of the components for a new weapon system are now required to be produced locally, which is clearly aimed at establishing their own independent weapons production. Chinese arms manufacturers, in particular, are willing to enter into such agreements.

All of this can be seen as part of the diversification of the economy that is currently taking place, given that it is now only a matter of time before the huge oil revenues dry up. So building a defence industry of its own also creates local jobs, which brings a lot of national prestige. It is no coincidence that Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Muhammed bin Salman’s major development plan, Vision 2030, aims to elevate five universities to the world’s top 200 list. This will also create a research environment serving the rapidly growing military industry.

This includes Saudi Arabia’s desire to become a nuclear power, which has been part of the 2023 negotiations between the Crown Prince and President Biden. No one is talking about nuclear weapons, but it is clear that Saudi Arabia wants to be able to stand up to Iran, which has long had its controversial nuclear programmes.

It is also in this context that the story of the 500 soldiers from Mauritania becomes relevant. Because in the Sahel region, as elsewhere in Africa, oil states have bought influence that can now be translated into potent military power. This is the whole story Jean-Loup Samaan tells in his excellent book, which paints a very worrying picture.